INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1991, the TFTR project, realizing the regulatory obstacles which lay ahead in successfully performing the required Operational Readiness Review (ORR) and bringing tritium to PPPL, formed an (ES&H) compliance branch. The project's ES&H branch reported directly to the TFTR Project Office, with the primary objective of identifying ORR tasks, including DOE orders which were germane to bringing tritium to the PPPL site. This work was performed in consultation with the independent PPPL ES&H Division.
The first task the newly formed ES&H branch performed was to develop a Regulatory Compliance Plan (RCP). The RCP provided a "road map" which documented and tracked applicable DOE orders, regulatory standards, and TFTR's level of compliance with such regulations. The RCP was mutually agreed to by PPPL senior managers and DOE officials regulating the management of the TFTR project.
The RCP identified dozens of tasks which would be required to bring TFTR to a successful ORR and to D-T operations, once such tasks were brought to closure.
FSAR
The TFTR Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was one of many tasks reflected in the RCP which required closure prior to proceeding with D-T. The FSAR was approved by DOE in 1982, was revised in 1988, and again in the 1990-1991 time frame to reflect the condition of the TFTR facility. In September 1991, the Department of Energy formed the Independent Review Group (IRG). The LRG was formed for the purpose of reviewing the TFTR FSAR and to make a recommendation to the Director of the DOE Office of Fusion Energy (OFE) on the results of the review. It was planned that the IRG would conduct its review from September 1991 to December 1991, and generate a report to be submitted to OFE in late December 1991. The IRG review consisted of site visits, review of source documents, and reviewing the FSAR directly. During this time period, the IRG consisted of personnel from within DOE and INEL. During the four month review period, the TFTR project supplied the IRG with several thousand pages of source documents including piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), control wire diagrams (CWDs), seismic reports, meteorological studies of the TFTR site, hydrological studies of the TFTR site, demographic studies of the area, etc. In December 1991, the IRG requested a meeting with PPPL in Washington D.C. to discuss the information previously received, the need for additional information, and comments which members of the IRG had documented during their review. The IRG, in conjunction with DOE-Chicago, and OFE had submitted > 400 comments (including requests for additional information) on the FSAR. The IRG contracted additional experts in the area of seismic qualification, industrial hygiene, and fire protection. The TFTR project responded by allocating additional resources to the FSAR, funding TFTR project engineers and consultants working on the project. The TFTR FSAR was ultimately reviewed by members of the IRG, DOE-Chicago (CH), DOE-OFE, INEL, DOE Office of Nuclear Safety (ONS) and DOE Environment Safety and Health (EH). A total of thirty-one outside experts reviewed and commented on the FSAR. In September 1992, the IRG generated a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which endorsed the FSAR for the TFTR Tritium Systems Test (< 1000 curies tritium). Additional information was requested prior to full D-T operations at TFTR would be approved.
The IRG maintained its review function for several 
TSR
A Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) document was developed in compliance with DOE Order 5480.22, concurrent with the IRG review of the FSAR. The IRG took part in the TFTR TSR development md review process. DOE Order 5480.22 brought many "iirsts" with it. TFTR was the first Energy Research (Eli) facility to be required to develop a TSR document. The TSR document generated much debate over the course of several months. Prior to this time TSR documents were requirements more closely associated with fission reactors. Fusion reactors do not easily fit into the requirements of TSR documents. A TFTR TSR document consisting of administrative control requirements, (consistent with its characterization as a "Low Hazard Facility"), was finalIy developed, and submitted to the DOE. Approval for the TSR document was received by DOE in April 1993. In addition to submitting a TSR document, TFTR also developed an operations procedure which established the operating parameters for tritium operations. The TSR operation document details the requirements necessary for maintaining a specific configuration and defines various operations of tritium movement throughout the TFTR facility.
IV. AUTHORIZATION BASIS
environmental assessment (EA), FSAR (including USQD revisions), the TSR (including implementing operational documents) and the SER. Revisions to the authorization basis which would change the parameters of the safety envelope require DOE approval prior to implementation.
V. ORR TEAM SITE VISIT
During the last week of July 1992, the Contractor Operational Readiness Review (C-ORR) chairman along with a team of 12 persons, visited the TFTR site to become acquainted with TFTR, and to conduct a Site Assistance Review. The purpose of the Site Assistance Review was ts review the FSAR, TSR, USQD check list, TFTR tritium operation procedures, fire protection procedures, tritium accountability, conduct of operations, etc., and to identify to PPPL what areas would require additional attention.
During this review, 201 findings were generated. These findings were divided into three categories. 109 findings were categorized as Category One findings, requiring resolution prior to bringing tritium on-site in quantities < 1000 curies, 64 were Category Two findings requiring resolution prior to bringing 50,000 curies of tritium on-site, and 28 were categorized as Category Three findings falling in the area of suggested practices which should be considered prior to D-T operations.
During the winter of 1992 much of the TFTR staff were actively involved in bringing issues associated with the site assistance review to closure.
On Alpril 5, 1993, the TFTR Tritium System Test (TST) ORR commenced. The C-ORR team consisted mainly of the majority of the same members of the 1992 review team. During the 2 week review, the C-ORR team reviewed all previous findings, con.ducted an emergency drill, reviewed tritium operating procedures and re-reviewed previously submitted documents (i.e. FSAR, TSR, USQD procedures, etc.).
At the conclusion of the C-ORR (TST), it was the unanimous consensus of the ORR team that Category One findings were successfully resolved, and that TFTR should proceed with the TST. The C-ORR chairman documented the results of the C-ORR and recommended to the PPPL ES&H Board that TFTR proceed with bringing < 1000 curies of tritium to TFTR to conduct the Tritium Systems Test. DOE concurred with the recommendations of the C-ORR chairman and approved the delivery of tritium to TFTR.
On April 29, 1993 
ABSTRACT
The Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL) will complete its experimental program with a series of deuterium-tritium pulses in 1994. As a result, the machine structures will become radioactive, and vacuum components will also be contaminated with tritium. Dose rate levels will range from less than 1 mr/h for external structures to approximately 200 mr/h for the vacuum vessel. Hence, decommissioning operations will range from hands on activities to the use of remotely operated equipment. After 21 months of cooldown, decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) operations will commence and continue for approximately 15 months. The primary objective is to render the test cell complex re-useable for the next machine, the Tokamak Physics Experiment (TPX).
This paper presents an overview of decommissioning TFTR and discusses the D&D objectives.
INTRODUCTION
TFTR is the major experiment in the Department of Energy's (DOE) Magnetic Fusion Energy Program. Until now, TFTR experimental operations essentially involved only hydrogen plasmas. Therefore, the machine still has full "hands-on" accessibility even though the vacuum vessel and some machine components have become mildly activated and tritium contaminated [ 11. Additional activation and contamination will occur when TFTR proceeds with tritium-fuelled experiments. Completion of the D-T pulses is scheduled for September 1994. At that time, D&D activities will commence with a Safe Shutdown period followed by dismantling, packaging, and shipping activities. The nature of D-T operations is such that all waste generated will be low level radioactive waste (LLRW).
PROJECT OBJECTIVES

A . Technical Objectives
The primary objective of the D&D Project is to remove activated and contaminated systems and components, and render the TFTR facility suitable for construction and operation of the Tokamak Physics Experiment. Specific objectives are: 9 safely disassemble activated and tritium-contaminated components and various ancillary systems in the test cell complex; apply remote disassembly and handling techniques to a large scale fusion facility; package disassembled components in accordance with DOE and Department of Transportation regulations; transport the packages to an approved DOE repository for LLRW disposal.
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The baseline approach presented in the TFTR Preliminary Decontamination & Decommissioning Plan is the basis for the feasibility of achieving the technical objectives 121. This plan was reviewed by an independent DOE panel in January 1992 which concluded that the technical approach was well developed, and the cost and schedule estimates were detailed and reasonable.
The TFIX D&D technical objectives are similar to those planned in the future for other large fusion facilities that will use D-T, namely, the Joint European Torus (JET) in Europe 133. In addition, this experience will provide valuable input during the design phase of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).
B . Schedule Objectives
The major schedule milestones for the D&D Project are listed below:
Conceptual Design Review
April 1994 
FACILITY DESCRIPTION
The portion of the TFTR facility involved in the D&D Project includes the test cell, test cell basement, hot cell, and mockup building. The machine systems and components that will require D&D include the tokamak machine, structure, diagnostics, neutral beamlines, ICRF system, pellet injectors, vacuum pumping systems, 0-7803-1412-3$04.00O1994IEEE cryogenic systems, and the machine area cooling fluid clean-up system, and tritium boundary HVAC will be left intact for possible reuse by P X .
A . Test Cell
The test cell shown in Figures 1 and 2 is a heavily shielded concrete structure, with interior dimensions of 150 ft. x 114 ft. x 54.5 ft. high, which houses the tokamak, neutral beamlines, diagnostic systems, and auxiliary equipment. The test cell is constructed of reinforced concrete with wall, roof, and floor thicknesses having been determined by both structural and radiation shielding requirements. The north and south walls of the test cell support a 110/25-ton capacity bridge crane. The test cell floor is designed to support the static weight of the TFTR machine (approximately 2,000 tons) in a 39 ft. diameter in the center of the building, and a live load of 3,500 lbs/ft2 for the area outside the center bay.
B . Hot Cell
The hot cell shown in Fig. 1 has interior dimensions of 60 ft. x 114 ft., and a ceiling height of 54.5 ft. The floor is at the same level as that of the adjacent test cell. Construction is of reinforced concrete throughout, with the floor slab 3 ft. thick, the roof 5 ft.-6 in. thick, the north and south walls 4 ft. thick and the east and west walls 3 ft. thick. The hot cell will not be activated nor contaminated and will permit unlimited personnel access. It will be the main area for packaging LLRW containers.
The structural floor slab and the transport system are designed to support and permit movement of the weight of a fully assembled neutral beamline. The hot cell contains a 75/15-ton overhead crane. The observation gallery has radiation shield windows and was designed for operating through-the-wall manipulators on the north and east walls of the cell.
C. Mock Up Building
The mock up building is located to the north of the test cell as shown in Fig. 1 . It contains a 40-ton bridge crane, and will be the main staging area for health physics operations. This building is the primary means of ingresdegress for all D&D operations in the test cell. The mock up building also contains the control room for remotely operated equipment and tools.
D. Basement Areas
systems. The tritium storage and delivery system, tritium basement level below the main experimental areas. Basement space below the test cell and hot cell has been assigned to diagnostic equipment, high voltage equipment, vacuum pumping equipment, electric bus runs for power supply to the machine, coil cooling fluid piping for the magnetic field coils, the tritium vault, tritium cleanup equipment and air handling equipment. D&D operations in the basement will be limited to the systems directly under the machine and the vacuum pumping piping.
D&D APPROACH
The current D&D baseline is presented in detail in [2] . It represents a conservative approach with regard to cost and schedule because it is based on totally dismantling, cutting up, and packaging all systems that make up the tokamak machine, and shipping the waste containers to the furthest repository from the PPPL site. Approximately 150 truckloads will carry almost 500 containers to DOE'S Hanford Disposal Site. DOE packaging and shipping criteria, as well as Hanford's waste acceptance criteria will be followed [4] .
Removal of the TFTR machine platform and the supporting columns located in the basement will not be required since they will be utilized by TPX. The doseequivalent at the machine platform after completion of D&D operations is estimated to be 7 pSv/hr (0.7 mremkr).
DECONTAMINATION
The baseline approach, i.e. TFTR operates with tritium and generates a total of 1x1021 neutrons [6], corresponds to a "worst case" scenario with respect to D&D. It is assumed that all components connected to the torus vacuum will be tritium contaminated. In addition, the majority of the tritium inventory remaining in the torus will be bound in the graphite tiles and codeposited on the vessel walls with eroded carbon from the tiles. Based on experimental measurements, it is assumed that 35% of the tritium put into the machine will be retained in the torus [61. He/O glow discharge cleaning is expected to reduce this amount. In addition, the neutral beamline enclosures are assumed to be tritium contaminated because the beamline cryogenic panels pump the plasma exhaust. Inventory estimates for the beamlines yield a maximum value of 0.2 g of tritium [6] . Decontamination of the neutral beams is expected to be difficult because of the complex configuration and large surface areas of the internal beamline components. Space for a variety of functions is located at the To the extent possible, decontamination of systems will be completed prior to disassembly and dismantlement tasks. Decontamination will continue as required throughout D&D operations to reduce personnel exposures and waste generated. Table I gives the contact dose rate at various machine locations for different cooling periods [2] . These values are dominated by 54Mn, 58C0, and 6oCo radioisotopes which are activation products of the stainless steel and inconel components. Refer to Fig. 2 for the component locations. Based on the dose rate figures above, all dismantling work from the TF coils to the center of the machine will be performed using remotely operated equipment and tools. It is anticipated that D&D of the vacuum vessel will require use of the TFTR Maintenance Manipulator Arm (MMA), an articulated boom equipped with a master/slave servomanipulator for in-vessel component removal and torus dismantling. Plasma arc cutting is the primary technique being considered to perform dismantling. Confinement tents will be used to limit the spread of contamination during these operations.
ACTIVATION LEVELS
PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS
The D&D Project is: revising the baseline to include alternative approaches for dismantling tokamak systems and cutting the torus; investigating the possibility of recycling up to 500 tonnes of stainless and copper materials; and is considering alternative approaches to waste packaging and shipping. The results of this work will form the basis for the conceptual design review in March 1994. Early in FY 1994, a solicitation will be made for a Technical Support Contractor to complement the engineering and planning activities, and a Technical Review Board will be selected. Small and large scale cutting demonstrations are also planned in FY 1994 to establish the cutting approach.
CONCLUSIONS
A baseline approach has been established based on the Project's Preliminary D&D Plan. Radiological inventory estimates were made to determine exposure to personnel, waste generation, and handling and disposal methods. Calculations of radioactive material inventories for the tokamak components indicate that the D&D waste will be Class A LLRW [5] . Waste resulting from TFTR D&D operations will consist of stainless steel and aluminum structures, diagnostic components, stainless piping, copper coils and buses, resin beds, filters, solidified radioactive liquids, and anti-C materials. Packaging and transportation will comply with DOE Orders, PPPL Procedures, and waste repository acceptance criteria. The amount of radioactive waste generated during D&D, including all packaging materials, will be more than 2500 tons. The total neutron induced radioactivity inventory to be disposed of is estimated to be 50 TBq (1400 Ci).
